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Inaugural Chairman of the Future Fund David Murray makes things perfectly plain in this interview with the Australian. The money in the Fund belongs to the government and it will do with it as it pleases:
the former chief executive of the Commonwealth Bank made it clear he did not see the fund operating at arm’s length from government like the Reserve Bank…
“The money doesn’t belong to the people in the fund, it belongs to the government and the community,” he said. “It has to be managed according to the direction of government…
“The Government has the right to determine what it does on behalf of the taxpayers in the community.”
Mr Murray said he was enthusiastic about accepting the offer to chair the Future Fund, as it was “well suited to my own approach”. “I believe very strongly in the concept of intergenerational equity,” he said.
“I believe in the community being good at saving and investing in the future.”
The Future Fund is based on the premise that the national saving task implied by an aging population should be met by the government setting itself up as an inter-generational financial intermediary, with the result that financial markets are partially nationalised by the Fund. Does anyone seriously believe that a fund subject to direction by government will do a better job ‘saving and investing in the future’ than individuals?
posted on 28 November 2005 by skirchner in Economics
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Woody Brock’s February 2004 paper on the relationship between US interest rates and the big dollar is a neat debunking of much of the conventional wisdom on this subject:
• If foreigners become disenchanted with US assets, and demand higher yields, can they get them? [No, other things being equal.]
• Can foreigners as a whole “pull out” their money from the US, thus driving up US real rates? [No.]
• Can foreigners as a whole refuse to acquire more US assets in the future (in order to finance future US trade deficits) thus driving up US interest rates? [No.]
• As the dollar falls, will the US experience a dose of “imported inflation”, thus driving up nominal interest rates? [Yes, but less than ever before due to structural changes in the global economy.]
• Can Asian central banks stop acquiring US IOUs? [Yes.] And if so, would this development send US interest rates soaring as the consensus expects? [No, the value of the dollar would take the hit much more than US yields.]
• How much more will the dollar fall before a new and more stable equilibrium can be achieved - an equilibrium including a balanced US trade account? [Much more than it has - largely because the value of the dollar has not been the cause of today’s trade imbalances.]
Woody greatly overstates the likely exchange rate adjustment in my view (eg, AUD-USD above parity,* a 300% revaluation in the yuan), but his analysis of the irrelevance of this process to the determination of US interest rates is essentially correct.
* Afterall, Australia has its own record current account deficit, for which a similar adjustment process is required.
posted on 26 November 2005 by skirchner in Economics
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You might not recommend Telstra shares to your mother, but few Mums and Dads would say no to them if they were given away for free. In today’s Australian, Terry McCrann (no link) is once again arguing for Telstra to be given away rather than sold. With a $14 billion surplus looming in the Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook, the argument for privatising Telstra by lot seems more compelling than ever. The government has effectively conceded it does not need the money by undertaking to place the proceeds from privatisation into a Future Fund, along with part of the budget surplus, where these funds will be used to buy other financial assets. These assets are supposed to provide a revenue stream to fund future expenditures, but there is no real difference between meeting these expenditures out of current or future revenue.
Empowering individuals to provide for their own future needs by endowing them with financial assets is much less problematic than the government setting itself up as an inter-generational financial intermediary. I have long argued that that any proceeds from the sale of Telstra should be rebated directly to the private superannuation accounts that every working Australian already owns. Giving away the government’s remaining equity in Telstra amounts to much the same thing.
posted on 26 November 2005 by skirchner in Economics
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Details of the Prediction Markets Summit can be found here, along with some links to related blogs.
posted on 26 November 2005 by skirchner in Economics
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Speculation is mounting that the Mid-Year Economic & Fiscal Outlook could report a budget surplus as high as $14 billion. This is bound to give added impetus to proposals for further tax reform, with major changes to the tax system now readily affordable, even within the confines of the surplus.
The actual release date for the MYEFO remains as illusive as ever. As in previous years, the Treasurer will release the document at his own convenience, often with minimal notice. The government’s failure to adhere to a simple timetable for the release of important budget documents says a great deal about the low standards for fiscal transparency and accountability at a federal level.
posted on 24 November 2005 by skirchner in Economics
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Protectionism is rarely as cynical and opportunistic as this:
Prominent Liberal backbencher Bruce Baird said the Government should take 25-year-old Nguyen’s execution into consideration during negotiations with Singapore Airlines over a share of the lucrative Australia-US air route.
The Government is expected to make a decision shortly on granting the airline, owned by the Singapore government, access to the route from which Qantas makes much of its profit.
Mr Baird, who heads the parliamentary amnesty group, told ABC radio that while clemency for Nguyen should not be a condition of a Singapore Airlines deal, it should be a consideration.
“I’m not saying it should be made a condition I just think it is one of the issues that should be taken into consideration because we have made a number of requests to them to consider our position, we have no death penalty in this country so they are out of step in terms of other developed countries and imposing the death penalty,” he said.
The story neglects to mention Baird is also a member of the parliamentary Friends of Tourism group and that his electorate includes Sydney Airport.
posted on 24 November 2005 by skirchner in Economics
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Ben Bernanke’s response to questions from Senator Bunning:
Concerns have been raised that the quantities of U.S. Treasury securities held by China
and other foreign investors, both private and official, have become so large as to increase the vulnerability of the U.S. economy to changes in the portfolio allocations of those investors. However, many of the reasons that investors hold these securities—their unparalleled safety and liquidity, together with the dollar’s traditional role as a reserve currency—are unlikely to disappear any time soon. Moreover, markets for dollar-denominated financial assets are extraordinarily deep; for example, foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasuries, of which holdings by China represent only a part, collectively account for only three percent of total U.S. credit market debt outstanding. Accordingly, U.S. financial markets would likely be able to absorb a significant shift in foreign official demands for U.S. debt, including by China.
posted on 24 November 2005 by skirchner in Economics
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Mark Thoma points to a piece in the FT by Peter Hartcher, criticising Ben Bernanke for his focus on inflation targeting at the expense of targeting asset prices. My review of Hartcher’s book, Bubble Man, explains why Bernanke is right and Hartcher is wrong:
Hartcher never ventures to suggest by how much the Fed should have tightened over this period. Instead, he quotes Fed research on the elasticity of stock prices to Fed funds rate shocks contained in a 2003 speech by then Federal Reserve Board Governor Ben Bernanke. In this context, Hartcher says that the idea that ‘monetary policy has a strong influence over the market…is supported by all the evidence from within the Fed itself’ (p. 151). Hartcher neglects to mention that the rest of Bernanke’s speech is in fact a compelling review of the theory and evidence against the proposition that monetary policy should respond to asset prices, citing no less than 20 academic papers and other sources on the subject. In particular, Bernanke summarises his argument by noting that ‘monetary policy can lower stock values only to the extent that it weakens the broader economy, and in particular that it makes households considerably worse off. Indeed, according to our analysis, policy would have to weaken the general economy quite significantly to obtain a large decline in stock prices.’
posted on 22 November 2005 by skirchner in Economics
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The federal government will need to make three appointments to the RBA Board between now and July next year, with the expiry of the current terms of Frank Lowy, Don McGauchie and Warwick McKibbin. There is speculation that former federal Treasurer of the Liberal Party and Fairfax Chairman Ron Walker might be appointed to the Board. Needless to say, this has the opposition fretting for the independence of the Bank:
Opposition treasury spokesman Wayne Swan said Mr Costello should rule out making Mr Walker one of the board’s members, who earn around $50,000 a year for their services.
He said appointing Mr Walker would undermine the independence of the board. “We simply cannot let one of the most important and sensitive organisations in Australia be compromised in this way by becoming a plaything for friends of the Howard government,” Mr Swan said in a statement.
“An independent Reserve Bank board is fundamental to sound economic management and stability, and should not be treated as a destination for Liberal Party mates or a payback for services rendered to the coalition.”
The precedent for political appointments to the Board was set long ago and concerns for the independence of the Bank in opposition are rarely sustained by governing parties. When Qantas was still in public ownership, it was said that the Qantas Board was like the House of Lords, a dumping ground for political patronage, and the RBA Board has not done much better under successive governments.
The AAP story notes the McGauchie was appointed to ‘represent rural interests,’ reflecting his past affiliation with the National Farmers Federation, but also that his current role as Telstra Chairman routinely puts him in conflict with both the government and the ACCC. The long-standing politicisation of the RBA Board is in many ways a secondary issue to the conflicts of interest inherent in the many hats some appointees bring to the Board table.
This point was effectively conceded in affidavits lodged with the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in the RBA’s attempts to prevent News Ltd gaining access to Board minutes under Freedom of Information legislation, a process that was brought to an end when a conclusive certificate was issued. This episode demonstrated that the current Board arrangements are simply incompatible with increased accountability and transparency on the part of the Bank. In the absence of reform to the governance arrangements for Bank, the main qualification for most Board appointments will remain a lack of expertise in monetary policy. The contrast with the candidates being considered to replace the two vacancies on the Fed Board of Governors (see previous post) is rather telling.
posted on 22 November 2005 by skirchner in Economics
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The FT reports on possible candidates to fill the two vacancies on the Federal Reserve Board of Governors:
The White House is considering appointing business leaders, financial markets participants or experts in regulation to the board, according to two people familiar with the administration’s deliberations.
“It does not mean they will not end up picking two academic economists but they feel [they] have the flexibility to look more broadly,” one of the people said.
Candidates for the vacancies include Kevin Warsh, a member of the National Economic Council, a lawyer who previously worked in Morgan Stanley’s investment banking department. Paul McCulley, a Fed-watcher and portfolio manager at Pimco, the fixed-income investment manager, is said to be one of a number of names put forward by Mr Bernanke as chairman of the White House Council.
Among the academic economists under consideration, Richard Clarida, a professor at Columbia University, was a Treasury official in President George W. Bush’s first term and is now a consultant to Clinton Group, the hedge fund. Randall Kroszner, a professor at the University of Chicago’s graduate school of business, is an expert on banking, international finance and financial regulation and served on the Council of Economic Advisers during Mr Bush’s first term.
The White House declined to comment on candidates or the timing of the nominations. There are currently no academic economists on the board.
Both Clarida and Kroszner would be excellent appointments. Appointing non-specialists with financial market backgrounds would be a mistake in my view, increasing the risk of the sort of regulatory capture by Wall Street that beset the US Treasury under Robert Rubin.
posted on 19 November 2005 by skirchner in Economics
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The latest data confirming record foreign demand for US assets and a decline in official sector purchases leaves the doomsday cultists simply incredulous:
if you believe the data, almost all the financing came from private investors abroad, who bought about $114 billion of US securities. That total includes around $90 billion of long-term debt. Corporate bonds were particularly popular. Central banks only bought $4 billion. I don’t believe that.
Brad is right to highlight the limitations of the TIC data. However, given recent gains in the USD index to two year highs, a reduction in foreign official sector purchases should come as no surprise, since there is less pressure on the managed exchange rate regimes of foreign central banks. There have even been suggestions that the Bank of Japan might soon intervene in foreign exchange markets to sell the USD. I’m far from convinced that such intervention is imminent, but if the BoJ turned a net seller of USD assets, this would pose a serious challenge to the view that the US is in any meaningful sense dependent on foreign central bank purchases of USD assets.
posted on 17 November 2005 by skirchner in Economics
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Assistant Productivity Commissioner Dean Parham strikes back at those who claim there have been no gains in productivity associated with microeconomic reform:
The ABS estimates reveal that, during the productivity cycle between 1993-94 and 1998-99, Australia’s annual rate of productivity growth was about half a percentage point above any other rate recorded and was nearly one percentage point above the long-term average. Clearly that was a dramatic rise.
A second issue is whether the higher productivity growth has disappeared. The ABS estimates put the average rate of growth between the productivity peaks in 1998-99 and 2003-04 at just below the average for the past four decades. This indeed indicates that growth is down from the ‘90s highs.
But some further digging into the data provides grounds to believe that the momentum in productivity growth did not disappear entirely. The key point is that there were some once-only factors at work - the Olympics, the GST, concerns about the Y2K bug - that dragged down the average for the cycle. While not a never-to-be-repeated factor, drought also reduced the average.
Australia’s underlying productivity growth in the 2000s has come off the exceptional highs of the ‘90s. However, if the effects of the once-off factors (if not drought) are discounted, average productivity growth during the latest cycle would still have been above the long-term average.
It should also be recalled that the relevant counter-factual in which there were no reforms is not being considered. Even if Australia’s productivity performance were deemed to be poor, this does not preclude the possibility that this performance could have been even worse had no reform had taken place.
posted on 17 November 2005 by skirchner in Economics
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David Altig weighs in on the Fed and M3, noting that:
From the point of view of a policy maker, why do we care about monetary measures in the first place? We care for the same reason everyone else does—because most of us still believe that, ultimately inflation, inflation is everywhere and always a monetary phenomenon.
There is robust cross-country empirical evidence for this proposition, but it is also easy to imagine situations in which tests for the long-run neutrality of money might fail due to permanent shocks to financial technology that disturb the velocity term in the quantity theory equation. If these shocks are not modelled explicitly, then they could show up as a unit root process in the residual from a cointegrating specification involving money and inflation.
An obvious example is Japan, where growth rates in base money in excess of 30% y/y have been observed alongside chronic deflation. Contrary to popular belief, monetarists have long recognised the potential for non-neutralities involving money. This does not mean that money is unimportant. But it highlights the fact that, even in the long-run, there may not be a straightforward relationship between money and inflation that would warrant the rather simplistic interpretation often given to growth rates in monetary aggregates.
posted on 16 November 2005 by skirchner in Economics
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The Economist’s outgoing Buttonwood columnist tells her readers that money doesn’t matter after all, welcome news for any readers who might have actually read Buttonwood for investment advice rather than for the pointless personal anecdotes.
posted on 16 November 2005 by skirchner in Economics
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Alan Wood points to Australian Treasury and BIS papers that highlight the extent to which the official community remain appropriately relaxed on the issue of external imbalances:
Based on a paper by Guy Debelle from the Reserve Bank and Gabriele Galati from the Bank for International Settlements, they also note that the historical record does not appear to contain any industrial-country examples of large current account deficits or stocks of net foreign liabilities having caused domestic economic downturns.
Markets treat countries such as Australia, with well developed financial markets and an ability to borrow in their own currency, very differently from developing countries in Asia or Latin America. There is no evidence rising foreign debt has forced Australia to pay any significant risk premium on its foreign borrowings.
To stop our foreign debt rising from around its present level of 60 per cent of GDP will require Australia to run future trade surpluses of between 0.5per cent and 0.75 per cent of GDP, which Gruen and Sayegh describe as not too onerous an adjustment task. Nor is it likely to matter much if it rises a bit further before it stabilises.
The national fear of large current account deficits and foreign debt of the ‘80s has little relevance in the 21st century, as long as we continue to run good economic policies - including labour market reform.
I would go further and argue that these phobias have not had any relevance since the end of Bretton Woods in the early 1970s.
posted on 16 November 2005 by skirchner in Economics
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