Fundamentals of House Price Inflation: ‘Bubbles’ as Rational Ignorance

For all the talk of a housing ‘bubble,’ very few seem willing to put this proposition to the test.  An exception is Craig Depken over at Division of Labour, who has some interesting empirical results relating housing ‘overvaluation’ to a few simple fundamentals for the US.

The IMF’s 2003 Article IV consultation with Australia was notable for hedging its bets on whether Australia was experiencing a house price ‘bubble.’  A look at the accompanying Selected Issues paper suggested why.  IMF staff modelling showed only a small deviation in the relative price of housing compared to that implied by a simple fundamental model.

Most ‘bubble’ talk is based on casual observation and the failure of observed valuations to conform with people’s prior beliefs and prejudices.  An obvious explanation for this is that most people are rationally ignorant about the underlying fundamentals (how many people could tell you the net inbound migration stats for Sydney over the last 12 months, for example).  The cost of acquiring this information exceeds its value for all but a handful of people.  Behavioural finance theories are often invoked to explain bubbles, but it is just as likely that the widespread belief in ‘bubbles’ is itself a behavioural finance phenomenon.  This is harmless enough in the hands of most people, but dangerous when it becomes the basis for public policy.

posted on 20 August 2005 by skirchner in Economics

(3) Comments | Permalink | Main

The Rise and Fall of Monetary Targeting: A Postscript

A postscript to my review of Simon Guttmann’s The Rise and Fall of Monetary Targeting in Australia.  Apparently, the publisher has withdrawn the book on legal grounds, which will make what was always going to be an inaccessible title even more so.  Given Australia’s draconian defamation laws, the withdrawal and pulping of books is not uncommon, although one would have thought that publishers would be sufficiently alert to these risks by now to avoid this sort of outcome.

As I indicated in my review, I don’t think Guttmann properly acknowledged the role played by the post-war revival of monetarist thought and the monetary targeting experiments of the 1970s and 80s in the evolution of contemporary monetary policy theory and practice.  For a work of both intellectual and economic history, this is a serious flaw.  Other readers evidently had their own, more personal, objections to Guttmann’s version of history. 

Who said monetary targeting had to be dull!

posted on 19 August 2005 by skirchner in Economics

(0) Comments | Permalink | Main

It’s a Kirchner Thing

When it comes to cleaning-up central banking, a Kirchner’s work is never done:

‘…Kirchner Fires Central Banker…’

posted on 19 August 2005 by skirchner in Economics

(0) Comments | Permalink | Main

Deflating Australia’s Housing ‘Bubble:’  Lessons for the Fed

Another article in the global press noting Australia’s experience with house price inflation, this time by Bloomberg columnist William Pesek in the IHT, who credits Australia’s ‘soft landing’ with deft monetary policy action by the RBA.  The emerging conventional wisdom is that the RBA has successfully deflated a housing ‘bubble’ through some well timed increases in interest rates.  The current tightening cycle, which began back in mid-2002, has in fact been remarkably restrained compared to previous cycles, leaving the official cash rate 75 bps below its previous cycle peak and not far from what is widely regarded as a neutral setting for the official cash rate.  So policy settings remain accommodative relative to the standards of previous cycles in Australia, partly because the increase in the net debtor status of the household sector has made monetary policy more potent relative to previous cycles.

What is not widely appreciated is that the RBA has generally disavowed the practice of directly targeting asset prices with monetary policy.  For example, this is what RBA Governor Macfarlane had to say last year in relation to housing-related credit growth:

In essence, monetary policy has one instrument – it can set the path of short-term interest rates. Over the past dozen years or so, it has set a path which has achieved the outcomes for inflation, growth and employment which I have just outlined.

What would have happened if, instead, we had aimed our monetary policy at one of the other objectives put forward, say a substantially lower growth of credit. I am not sure whether we would have been able to achieve this, but I do know that the attempt to do so would have required setting a path of interest rates which was significantly higher than the one we did. This, in turn, would have meant that the outcomes for inflation and economic growth would have been lower than we actually achieved. I do not think this would have been a good economic result, and it certainly would have violated the letter and the spirit of our agreement on accountability. As I said earlier, a central bank cannot be accountable for everything, and our monetary regime recognises this, while at the same time choosing the right objective to be accountable for.

While the RBA deserves considerable credit for its handling of monetary policy, it has conducted interest rate policy in an entirely conventional way.  The lesson from Australia’s experience is not that monetary policy should target house prices (which as Macfarlane notes, would not be consistent with its mandate), but that a well formulated inflation targeting regime is a good general framework for policy.  This is the lesson the Fed should take away from Australia’s experience.

posted on 18 August 2005 by skirchner in Economics

(1) Comments | Permalink | Main

Does the Composition of Foreign Securities Purchases Really Matter?

Every month, we see certain economics bloggers pouring over the data on net foreign securities purchases for the US, trying to discern implications for strength or otherwise in the financing of the US current account deficit.  In fact, the current account deficit must be financed by definition, so the absolute amount of financing is never in question, yet many analysts persist in approaching these data as though the financial account tail wags the current account dog.

For a given domestic saving-investment imbalance, asset prices adjust to ensure that the resulting current account deficit is financed.  Shifts in the asset composition of the financial account are likely to reflect changes in relative asset prices, but the absolute value of this financing is essentially pre-determined for a given current account deficit.  Only the prices these assets trade at is in question, and these reflect the influence of all market participants, not just those foreigners looking to recycle surplus USD receipts because of systemic problems in their own domestic capital markets, which renders their funding of the US current account deficit non-discretionary.  US asset pricing has of course remained remarkably robust throughout the recent deterioration in the current account, as many US bond and dollar bears have discovered at great cost.

As RBA Governor Macfarlane has argued persuasively before a Chinese audience, countries with open capital markets and floating exchange rates do not face an external financing constraint.  Countries with managed exchange rate regimes and closed capital markets have the bigger problem.

posted on 17 August 2005 by skirchner in Economics

(0) Comments | Permalink | Main

Skilled Migrants or Guest Workers?

The Federal government has launched a campaign to fill 20,000 new places in the skilled migration program.  This comes after Federal Treasurer Peter Costello ruled out the use of ‘guest workers’ as being ‘inconsistent with Australian values,’ despite being an obvious way of meeting both skilled and unskilled labour shortages and an effective form of development assistance for source countries.  Of course, we already have a de facto guest worker scheme in the form of European backpackers on working holiday visas, so a new guest worker visa category is not such a great leap.

What surprises me is that very few people see the guest worker concept as also being an obvious solution to the high cost of child care and the work-family balance issue.  Creating a special visa category for live-in amahs from South East Asia could dramatically lower the cost of child care and domestic help and promote higher labour force participation rates.

posted on 16 August 2005 by skirchner in Economics

(1) Comments | Permalink | Main

GetUp!: ‘We Know Where You Live’

Glenn Milne notes some interesting parallels between the corporate governance practices of the latte left and the nativist right:

There is an eerie similarity between GetUp!‘s company structure and One Nation - a structure that could have allowed Pauline Hanson and her fellow company directors to walk away with millions in donations from supporters. And there are questions about the level of personal detail required by GetUp! from new members - detail that involves financial information and profiling tailor-made to establish a database for use in direct-mail campaigns during elections. Or for commercial purposes…

In political terms, this sort of information is an election campaign goldmine. While GetUp! states that it won’t “sell, trade or exchange your information without your permission”, it adds, “your information may be used to identify your location (electorate, state) and provide targeted and relevant opportunities for you to be part of our activities”.

...and a free set of steak knives.  In any other context, the left would be deeply suspicious.

posted on 15 August 2005 by skirchner in Politics

(0) Comments | Permalink | Main

The Fed Succession: When Supply-Siders Attack

The WSJ surveys US economists on their preferred replacement for Alan Greenspan, with CEA Chair Ben Bernanke commanding a plurality of support at 30%.  Bernanke is also still the favourite on Intrade, although the Bernanke contract has suffered recently in the wake of a Lawrence Lindsay rally (dare I suggest ‘bubble’?) on the strength of a favourable mention in another WSJ story.  Perhaps the biggest uncertainty about each of the candidates is whether they actually want the job.  Bernanke would make a fine Fed Chairman, although I think Martin Feldstein is the stronger prospect.

We previously noted Bryan Caplan’s defence of Bernanke against the attack of the fever swamp Austrians.  Leading free banking theorist Larry White also offers a partial defence of Bernanke against a rather strange and ill-considered attack from the National Review’s knee-jerk supply-siders.  As someone who is also partial to free banking (albeit of the Yeager-Greenfield BFH variety), I have very few reservations about Bernanke.  Indeed, some of Bernanke’s recent work is consistent with the views of pre-rational expectations, old school monetarism, a departure from the neo-Wicksellian paradigm that dominates contemporary thinking about monetary policy. 

The WSJ story quotes at least one analyst saying:

financial markets have become overly complacent about the succession question. He says any successor, no matter how sound, will be selected at some cost to the markets.

“Nobody can replace Greenspan’s reputation,” Mr. Harris says. “His reputation helps keep low risk premiums in the markets. That will be lost on the day he retires. It can be re-earned by the next chairman, but there will be some loss.”

One of the costs associated with the highly discretionary approach to monetary policy personified by Alan Greenspan is the failure to institutionalise the Fed’s credibility.  Hopefully, the next Fed Chair will begin the task of formalising an inflation targeting framework for US monetary policy.

posted on 13 August 2005 by skirchner in Economics

(0) Comments | Permalink | Main

RBA Governor Macfarlane: Economic Myth Buster

RBA Governor Macfarlane’s appearances before the House Economics Committee see some woeful displays of economic ignorance and ham-fisted attempts at political point-scoring on the part of Committee members.  Most of their questions consist of wildly partisan statements with which they then invite the Governor to agree, as if Macfarlane is not smart enough to see them coming.  In what is invariably a very classy performance, Macfarlane and his senior officers patiently listen to these questions and elevate the proceedings by turning them into some much needed education for Committee members and the public. 

Particularly interesting were Deputy Governor Stevens’ remarks on the results of the RBA’s current research into home equity withdrawal.  Stevens said that the early results point to something this blog has been arguing for some time, that very little of this is going into consumption, but instead into other financial assets.  As Stevens pointed out, if home equity withdrawal had all been going into consumption, we would have already seen a massive boom and bust in consumption and this is not remotely supported by the data.  When this research is finally published, it will almost certainly make a lot of commentary on this subject look very silly.

Macfarlane noted that the boom and subsequent correction in Sydney house prices closely matched what was happening with population growth in NSW and suggested that the recent decline in house prices was attributable to net emigration from the state, which in turn is driven by housing affordability.  In other words, there are some sound fundamental reasons for the observed behaviour of Sydney house prices, with feedback from house prices to population growth as falling housing affordability drives people out of the state.  Macfarlane did lapse into using the term ‘bubble,’ but I think this was just a concession to popular usage that is belied by what he had to say on the subject.

Macfarlane also agued, consistent with the consenting adults view, that none of us can know what the ‘right’ net foreign debt to GDP or private debt ratios should be, and also noted that fiscal policy has not had a major impact on monetary policy in the last seven years. 

Perhaps the funniest moment was when a Committee member tried to argue against the privatisation of Telstra, on the grounds that consumption would suffer as people bought newly issued Telstra stock.  Deputy Governor Stevens suggested that the impact on consumption would be zero ‘as a first approximation.’  The member in question probably still does not realise how stupid this made him look.

The Hansard transcript of proceedings should eventually appear on the RBA web site, for those who are interested.

posted on 12 August 2005 by skirchner in Economics

(2) Comments | Permalink | Main

Economics Blogs Lead Wall Street

The WSJ profiles economic blogs:

While many investors continue to take their cues from traditional outlets, the real news junkies—including those who aim to get a trading idea before they hear about it from their broker—have bookmarked the blogs, or Web logs. Even Wall Street itself is paying heed.

“It’s all about the ‘memes,’ ” says Stan Jonas, head of interest rate strategy at Fimat USA in New York, employing a word that describes ideas that spread quickly by word of mouth—or Web. “Those guys say it and about a week or two later, the guys on Wall Street pick it up.”

posted on 12 August 2005 by skirchner in Economics

(0) Comments | Permalink | Main

Bubble Triple Jump

Glenn Rudebusch suggests a few hurdles that need to be satisfied before monetary policy responds to ‘bubbles:’

The decision tree for choosing a Bubble Policy poses a daunting triple jump. For example, consider the run-up in the stock market in 1999 and 2000, when there was widespread suspicion that an equity price bubble existed and people worried that it could result in capital misallocation and financial instability. Still, those worries did not spur a Bubble Policy, in large part because it appeared unlikely that monetary policy could have deflated the equity price bubble without substantial costs to the economy. After the fact, of course, the macroeconomic consequences from the apparent boom and bust in equity prices arguably have been manageable.

However, the decision tree does not provide a blanket prohibition on bubble reduction, and as yet, there is no bottom line on the appropriate policy response to asset price bubbles. Those who oppose a Bubble Policy stress the steep informational prerequisites for success, while those who favor it note that policymakers often must act on the basis of incomplete knowledge.

posted on 11 August 2005 by skirchner in Economics

(0) Comments | Permalink | Main

Stalked by the ‘Bubble’ Brigade

Housing ‘bubble’ stalkers.

posted on 10 August 2005 by skirchner in Economics

(1) Comments | Permalink | Main

Allan Fels as Next OECD Secretary-General?

Place your bets here.

posted on 10 August 2005 by skirchner in Economics

(0) Comments | Permalink | Main

Review of Bubble Man: Alan Greenspan & the Missing 7 Trillion Dollars

My review of Peter Hartcher’s (2005) Bubble Man:  Alan Greenspan & the Missing 7 Trillion Dollars.  Black Inc: Melbourne.

continue reading

posted on 10 August 2005 by skirchner in Economics

(1) Comments | Permalink | Main

Australian House Price Developments

The RBA’s quarterly Statement on Monetary Policy includes a useful discussion of recent house price developments.  One of the major problems with existing house price data is that the majority of the measured variation is attributable to compositional distortions, so the RBA has developed an index which adjusts for these shifts, giving a more reliable and less volatile series for house prices.

The RBA seems to have come around to a rather benign view of the role of recent house price developments in the economy, consistent with the view I have been arguing for some time:

The correction in the housing market appears so far to have proceeded reasonably smoothly, and the prospect of an excessive and unwelcome slowing in domestic demand has been reduced by the boost to national incomes coming from the favourable terms of trade.

posted on 08 August 2005 by skirchner in Economics

(7) Comments | Permalink | Main

Page 100 of 111 pages ‹ First  < 98 99 100 101 102 >  Last ›